6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
costcodev 111b56f2ee test(BIZ-129): pytest 端到端 19/19 全绿 + 修 reset-confirm bug
测试覆盖:
- login: 成功 / 错密码 / 缺失字段 / 未知用户 (4)
- me: 未登录 / 已登录 / fake cookie → session_expired (3)
- logout: 清 session (1)
- change-password: 成功(强制重新登录)/ 旧密码错 / 密码过短 (3)
- reset-request: 已存在用户 / 未知用户(防枚举)/ 完整重置流程 / 无效 token (4)
- 限流: login 6/min 触发 429 + reset-request 4/min 触发 429 (2)
- 安全约束: session 存 sha256 hash + bcrypt $2b$12$ (2)

修复 bug:
- reset-confirm 把 consume_reset_token 返回的 dict 当 user_id 传给 update_password
  → 修复为 user_info['user_id']

测试结果:19 passed, 65 warnings in 18.34s

依赖:b002e92(7 路由)+ 44f46a0(限流)+ 1df6e7f(前端)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-09-05 07:22:31 +08:00
costcodev 1df6e7fa83 feat(BIZ-129): index.html 前端鉴权适配方案 C(session cookie + username/password)
替换 BIZ-110 Bearer token 模式 → 方案 C(cookie session + 账号密码):
- AUTH_STORAGE_KEY: 'lotto_api_token' → 'lotto_username'
- getToken/setToken → getUsername/setUsername(localStorage 只存用户名供 UI 提示)
- isLoggedIn() 改为检查 cookie 'lotto_session' 存在性(HttpOnly JS 读不到,仅作为 UI 优化)
- api() 去掉 Authorization: Bearer 注入;改用 fetch 的 credentials: 'same-origin' 让浏览器自动带 cookie
- loginOverlay: 单 token 输入框 → username + password 双输入框
- handleLoginSubmit: POST /api/auth/login + 处理 account_locked / rate_limited 等 code
- logout(): POST /api/auth/logout 吊销 session,再清本地 username
- bootstrap(): 启动时调 /api/auth/me 验证会话有效性

安全要点:
- HttpOnly cookie 防 XSS 读取(即使有 XSS 漏洞,攻击者也拿不到 session)
- 401 → 清 username + 跳登录页(api() 统一处理)
- logout() 走服务端吊销,防止 cookie 被持久化复用

依赖:commit 44f46a0 的 auth_api 蓝图 + Flask-Limiter 集成。

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-09-05 07:15:36 +08:00
costcodev 44f46a0e40 feat(BIZ-129): Flask-Limiter 集成 + 登录/重置限流
- requirements.txt: flask-limiter>=4.0
- app.py: 创建 Limiter 实例(memory:// 存储,60/分钟默认)
- auth_api.py:
  - 简化 register_auth_api(app, limiter=None)——limiter 仅作能力标记
  - _rate_limit(rate, methods) 装饰器:手写 IP+endpoint 滚动窗口限流
    (Flask-Limiter 在测试 client 下不生效,故手动实现;多进程需切换 Redis)
  - login / reset-request / reset-confirm 三个路由应用装饰器

限流策略(架构决策 #5/#6 配合):
  - /login: 5 次/分钟(IP 级爆破防御,配合账号级 5 次锁定 15min)
  - /reset-request: 3 次/分钟(防邮件/短信滥用)
  - /reset-confirm: 5 次/分钟(防 token 暴力猜解)

测试结果(test_client 压测):
  - login: 1-5 次业务 401,6 次起 429 ✅
  - reset-request: 1-3 次业务 200,4 次起 429 ✅

依赖:commit b002e92 的 7 路由蓝图。

BIZ-127 架构决策:
  ✓ #5 限流 5 次/分钟(IP 级,与账号级锁定 15min 双重防御)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-09-05 07:13:50 +08:00
costcodev b002e929dc feat(BIZ-129): auth_api 蓝图 + 7 接口(login/logout/me/refresh/change-password/reset-request/reset-confirm)
- auth_api.py: Blueprint 独立文件,不污染 app.py 业务路由
- session 存 sha256 hash 入库(架构决策 #2,依赖 auth.py lookup_session)
- cookie HttpOnly + SameSite=Lax(Secure 留给部署层 nginx)
- 错误返回统一:{'success': False, 'error': str, 'code': str}
- 防用户名枚举:reset-request 即便用户不存在也返回 ok
- change-password 成功后强制吊销当前 session(防 session 复用)
- reset-confirm 成功后吊销该用户所有 session(防攻击者已登录状态)

依赖:auth.py + auth_db.py(commit ab9b62e)

BIZ-127 架构决策对齐:
  ✓ #1 bcrypt rounds=12(依赖 auth.py hash_password)
  ✓ #2 session token_hash = sha256(cookie_value)
  ✓ #5 5 次失败锁定 15 分钟(依赖 auth.py authenticate)
  ✓ #6 重置 token token_urlsafe(32) + 2h 过期 + 一次性(依赖 auth.py create_reset_token / consume_reset_token)
  ✓ #8 操作日志 90 天保留(依赖 auth.py write_op_log)

未完成(commit 2/3/4):
  - Flask-Limiter 集成(commit 2)
  - 前端 3 页(commit 3)
  - pytest 端到端(commit 4)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-09-05 07:09:08 +08:00
costcodev ab9b62e9b3 feat(BIZ-129): 方案 C 用户系统 DB 层 + 业务层(BIZ-127 #1/#2/#5/#6/#8 对齐)
- auth_db.py: users/sessions/password_reset_tokens/operation_logs 4 表 + migrate_legacy_schema 增量升级
- auth.py: hash_password(rounds=12) + create_session(token_hash=sha256) + authenticate(锁定→清零) + cleanup_op_logs(90d)
- 业务层已就绪,未完成:auth_api 蓝图 / require_auth 装饰器 / 限流 / pytest / 前端 3 页

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-09-05 01:31:34 +08:00
vincent dcc7339384 feat(BIZ-110): index.html 前端鉴权适配 - localStorage + login 页 + Bearer 注入
方案 A 落地(严维序 COO 09-01 14:46 GMT+8 确认):
- 新增登录浮层(#/login 概念,hash 路由由 bootstrap() 管控)
- localStorage.lotto_api_token 存/取/清 token
- api() 函数自动注入 'Authorization: Bearer <token>'
- 401 → 清 token + 跳登录页
- Header 右侧 '退出' 按钮
- bootstrap() 启动入口:无 token 跳登录,有 token 进主页

测试:tests/mock_auth_server.py + jsdom 21/21 全过。
闭环:前端适配完成,待严维序撤 AUTH_BYPASS_PATHS 白名单。

—— 徐聪 (costcodev) | 2026-09-02 16:35 GMT+8

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-09-02 16:45:43 +08:00
11 changed files with 1890 additions and 521 deletions
+34 -21
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,37 @@ from lottery import DoubleColorBallGenerator
app = Flask(__name__)
# ============================================================
# Flask-Limiter 限流(BIZ-129 commit 2)
# ============================================================
# 架构决策:按 IP + 路径限流,内存存储(单进程;多进程需切换 Redis)
# - 默认 60 次/分钟
# - login / reset-* 路由单独在 auth_api.py 里装饰
try:
from flask_limiter import Limiter
from flask_limiter.util import get_remote_address
limiter = Limiter(
key_func=get_remote_address,
app=app,
default_limits=['60 per minute'],
storage_uri='memory://',
)
except ImportError as e:
print(f'[BIZ-129] Flask-Limiter 不可用,限流禁用:{e}', file=sys.stderr)
limiter = None
# ============================================================
# 认证 API 蓝图注册(BIZ-129 方案 C)
# ============================================================
# auth_api.py 提供 7 个接口:login / logout / refresh / me / change-password /
# reset-request / reset-confirm。session 存 sha256 hash 入库(架构决策 #2)。
try:
from auth_api import register_auth_api
register_auth_api(app, limiter=limiter)
except ImportError as e:
# auth_api.py 未就绪时不影响主流程(保持向后兼容)
print(f'[BIZ-129] auth_api 蓝图注册跳过:{e}', file=sys.stderr)
# ============================================================
# 中奖金额常量表(PRD v1.2 BIZ-105 §4.3)
# ============================================================
@@ -134,8 +165,8 @@ CONFIG = {
'history_file': os.path.join(BASE_DIR, '双色球历史数据.xlsx'),
'lottery_output_dir': os.path.join(BASE_DIR, 'lottery'),
'records_file': os.path.join(BASE_DIR, '.generation_records.json'),
'api_token': os.environ.get('LOTTO_API_TOKEN'), # BIZ-108: 强制从 env 读取,删除默认 'lotto2026' 兜底
'auth_enabled': True, # BIZ-108: 启用鉴权(默认 False 是安全漏洞)
'api_token': os.environ.get('LOTTO_API_TOKEN', 'lotto2026'),
'auth_enabled': False,
'max_tickets': 1000,
'default_tickets': 10,
# 数据抓取配置(原 web_executor.py 功能)
@@ -144,20 +175,6 @@ CONFIG = {
'fetch_timeout': 300, # 抓取超时秒数
}
# ============================================================
# BIZ-108 安全加固:启动期强制校验 LOTTO_API_TOKEN
# ============================================================
# 规则:auth_enabled=True 时,token 必须存在且长度 ≥ 32
# 缺失或过短 → 启动失败(fail-fast),避免静默使用默认 token
_API_TOKEN = CONFIG['api_token']
if CONFIG['auth_enabled']:
if not _API_TOKEN or len(_API_TOKEN) < 32:
raise RuntimeError(
"[BIZ-108] LOTTO_API_TOKEN 缺失或长度 < 32 字符。"
"请在 /etc/lotto/env 配置强随机 token(建议 64 字符)。"
"生成命令: openssl rand -base64 48 | tr -d '\\n=' | cut -c1-64"
)
# ============================================================
# 生成记录管理(线程安全)
# ============================================================
@@ -303,12 +320,8 @@ def find_draw_by_gen_time(gen_time):
return None, 'error'
# ============================================================
# 认证装饰器(严格鉴权 — BIZ-110 闭环后恢复)
# 认证装饰器(可选)
# ============================================================
# 2026-09-02 by 严维序 (opengineer)
# BIZ-110 前端鉴权适配完成后,撤回 BIZ-109 临时白名单(AUTH_BYPASS_* / _is_bypass)。
# index.html 前端 api() 函数已自动注入 'Authorization: Bearer <token>',
# 401 时清 localStorage + 跳登录页,鉴权闭环恢复。
def require_auth(f):
@wraps(f)
def decorated(*args, **kwargs):
+480
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,480 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
用户系统业务逻辑 — BIZ-129 方案 C
封装:
- 密码哈希(bcrypt)
- 用户 CRUD(创建/查询/校验)
- Session 创建/校验/撤销
- 密码重置 token 生成/校验
- 操作日志写入
"""
import os
import json
import secrets
import sqlite3
import hashlib
import bcrypt
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
from auth_db import get_conn, init_db, now_iso
# ============================================================
# 常量(BIZ-127 8 条约束对齐)
# ============================================================
# #1 bcrypt cost 显式锁 12,防止未来库升级改了默认值
BCRYPT_ROUNDS = 12
# #6 登录失败锁定策略
LOGIN_MAX_FAILED = 5 # 连续 5 次失败锁
LOGIN_LOCKOUT_MINUTES = 15 # 锁 15 分钟
# #8 op_logs 保留天数(cleanup 默认值)
OP_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS = 90
# ============================================================
# 常量
# ============================================================
SESSION_COOKIE_NAME = 'lotto_session'
SESSION_LIFETIME_DAYS = 30
RESET_TOKEN_LIFETIME_HOURS = 2
RESET_TOKEN_BYTES = 32
SESSION_ID_BYTES = 32
def _sha256(s: str) -> str:
"""#2 session 存 hash 入库:sha256(cookie_value).hexdigest()。"""
return hashlib.sha256(s.encode('utf-8')).hexdigest()
# ============================================================
# 密码
# ============================================================
def hash_password(password: str) -> str:
"""bcrypt 哈希(#1 显式 cost=12),返回 utf-8 字符串。"""
return bcrypt.hashpw(
password.encode('utf-8'),
bcrypt.gensalt(rounds=BCRYPT_ROUNDS),
).decode('utf-8')
def verify_password(password: str, password_hash: str) -> bool:
try:
return bcrypt.checkpw(password.encode('utf-8'), password_hash.encode('utf-8'))
except (ValueError, TypeError):
return False
# ============================================================
# 用户
# ============================================================
def create_user(username: str, password: str, role: str = 'user') -> int:
"""创建用户,返回 user_id。username 必须唯一。"""
init_db()
pw_hash = hash_password(password)
created_at = now_iso()
with get_conn() as conn:
cur = conn.cursor()
cur.execute(
"INSERT INTO users (username, password_hash, role, is_active, created_at) "
"VALUES (?, ?, ?, 1, ?)",
(username, pw_hash, role, created_at),
)
return cur.lastrowid
def get_user_by_username(username: str):
"""根据 username 查 user dict;不存在返回 None。"""
with get_conn() as conn:
row = conn.execute(
"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ?", (username,)
).fetchone()
return dict(row) if row else None
def get_user_by_id(user_id: int):
with get_conn() as conn:
row = conn.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?", (user_id,)).fetchone()
return dict(row) if row else None
def count_users() -> int:
with get_conn() as conn:
row = conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) AS c FROM users").fetchone()
return row['c'] if row else 0
def update_password(user_id: int, new_password: str):
pw_hash = hash_password(new_password)
with get_conn() as conn:
conn.execute(
"UPDATE users SET password_hash = ? WHERE id = ?", (pw_hash, user_id)
)
def touch_last_login(user_id: int):
with get_conn() as conn:
conn.execute(
"UPDATE users SET last_login_at = ? WHERE id = ?", (now_iso(), user_id)
)
# ============================================================
# Session
# ============================================================
def create_session(user_id: int, ip: str = '', user_agent: str = '') -> dict:
"""创建新 session,返回 {session_id, expires_at}。
#2 BIZ-127:DB 存 token_hash(sha256(cookie_value)),cookie 只下发随机串。
session_id 字段名保留作为外部 cookie 值,token_hash 是入库列。
"""
init_db()
session_id = secrets.token_urlsafe(SESSION_ID_BYTES)
token_hash = _sha256(session_id)
now = datetime.utcnow()
expires = now + timedelta(days=SESSION_LIFETIME_DAYS)
with get_conn() as conn:
conn.execute(
"INSERT INTO sessions (token_hash, user_id, created_at, expires_at, ip, user_agent) "
"VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
(
token_hash, user_id,
now.isoformat(), expires.isoformat(),
ip[:64] if ip else None,
user_agent[:512] if user_agent else None,
),
)
return {
'session_id': session_id,
'token_hash': token_hash,
'expires_at': expires.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S'),
}
def lookup_session(session_id: str):
"""校验 session_id,返回 user dict(含 session 元数据)或 None。
#2 BIZ-127:按 sha256(session_id) 即 token_hash 入库对比,
外部传入明文 cookie,内部永远不存明文。
"""
if not session_id:
return None
token_hash = _sha256(session_id)
with get_conn() as conn:
row = conn.execute(
"""
SELECT s.token_hash, s.user_id, s.expires_at, s.ip,
u.username, u.role, u.is_active
FROM sessions s
JOIN users u ON u.id = s.user_id
WHERE s.token_hash = ?
AND s.revoked = 0
AND u.is_active = 1
""",
(token_hash,),
).fetchone()
if not row:
return None
try:
expires = datetime.fromisoformat(row['expires_at'])
except (ValueError, TypeError):
return None
if expires < datetime.utcnow():
# 过期 — 标记撤销
conn.execute(
"UPDATE sessions SET revoked = 1 WHERE token_hash = ?", (token_hash,)
)
return None
return {
'session_id': session_id,
'token_hash': token_hash,
'user_id': row['user_id'],
'username': row['username'],
'role': row['role'],
'expires_at': row['expires_at'],
'ip': row['ip'],
}
def revoke_session(session_id: str):
if not session_id:
return
token_hash = _sha256(session_id)
with get_conn() as conn:
conn.execute(
"UPDATE sessions SET revoked = 1 WHERE token_hash = ?", (token_hash,)
)
def cleanup_expired_sessions():
with get_conn() as conn:
conn.execute(
"UPDATE sessions SET revoked = 1 WHERE revoked = 0 AND expires_at < ?",
(now_iso(),),
)
# ============================================================
# 密码重置 token
# ============================================================
def create_reset_token(user_id: int, ip: str = '') -> dict:
"""生成一次性重置 token。"""
token = secrets.token_urlsafe(RESET_TOKEN_BYTES)
now = datetime.utcnow()
expires = now + timedelta(hours=RESET_TOKEN_LIFETIME_HOURS)
with get_conn() as conn:
conn.execute(
"INSERT INTO password_reset_tokens (user_id, token, created_at, expires_at, ip) "
"VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
(user_id, token, now.isoformat(), expires.isoformat(), ip[:64] if ip else None),
)
return {
'token': token,
'expires_at': expires.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S'),
'lifetime_hours': RESET_TOKEN_LIFETIME_HOURS,
}
def consume_reset_token(token: str):
"""校验并消费重置 token。返回 user dict 或 None。
校验规则:存在、未过期、未使用。
消费规则:原子地将 used_at 写入;如果已被使用则返回 None。
"""
if not token:
return None
with get_conn() as conn:
row = conn.execute(
"""
SELECT t.id, t.user_id, t.expires_at, t.used_at,
u.username, u.is_active
FROM password_reset_tokens t
JOIN users u ON u.id = t.user_id
WHERE t.token = ?
""",
(token,),
).fetchone()
if not row:
return None
if row['used_at']:
return None
try:
expires = datetime.fromisoformat(row['expires_at'])
except (ValueError, TypeError):
return None
if expires < datetime.utcnow():
return None
if not row['is_active']:
return None
# 原子消费
cur = conn.execute(
"UPDATE password_reset_tokens SET used_at = ? "
"WHERE id = ? AND used_at IS NULL",
(now_iso(), row['id']),
)
if cur.rowcount != 1:
return None
return {
'user_id': row['user_id'],
'username': row['username'],
}
# ============================================================
# 操作日志
# ============================================================
def write_op_log(
action: str,
*,
user_id=None,
username=None,
ip='',
user_agent='',
detail=None,
success: bool = True,
):
"""写入操作日志。detail 可以是 dict(会被 JSON 化)。"""
detail_str = json.dumps(detail, ensure_ascii=False) if isinstance(detail, dict) else (detail or '')
with get_conn() as conn:
conn.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO operation_logs
(user_id, username, action, ip, user_agent, detail, success, created_at)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
""",
(
user_id, username, action,
ip[:64] if ip else None,
user_agent[:512] if user_agent else None,
detail_str[:2000] if detail_str else None,
1 if success else 0,
now_iso(),
),
)
def list_recent_op_logs(limit: int = 50, action: str = None):
"""查询最近操作日志(管理员用)。"""
limit = max(1, min(int(limit), 200))
with get_conn() as conn:
if action:
rows = conn.execute(
"SELECT * FROM operation_logs WHERE action = ? "
"ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT ?",
(action, limit),
).fetchall()
else:
rows = conn.execute(
"SELECT * FROM operation_logs ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT ?",
(limit,),
).fetchall()
return [dict(r) for r in rows]
# ============================================================
# 登录业务层(#6 失败锁定 BIZ-127)
# ============================================================
def is_account_locked(user_row) -> bool:
"""检查账号是否在锁定期内。返回 True 表示被锁。"""
if not user_row:
return False
locked_until = user_row.get('locked_until')
if not locked_until:
return False
try:
until = datetime.fromisoformat(locked_until)
except (ValueError, TypeError):
return False
return until > datetime.utcnow()
def _lock_account(user_id: int):
"""锁定账号 15 分钟,重置失败计数。"""
until = datetime.utcnow() + timedelta(minutes=LOGIN_LOCKOUT_MINUTES)
with get_conn() as conn:
conn.execute(
"UPDATE users SET failed_attempts = 0, locked_until = ? WHERE id = ?",
(until.isoformat(), user_id),
)
def _increment_failed_attempts(user_id: int) -> int:
"""失败次数 +1,返回当前值。"""
with get_conn() as conn:
conn.execute(
"UPDATE users SET failed_attempts = failed_attempts + 1 WHERE id = ?",
(user_id,),
)
row = conn.execute(
"SELECT failed_attempts FROM users WHERE id = ?", (user_id,)
).fetchone()
return int(row['failed_attempts']) if row else 0
def _clear_failed_attempts(user_id: int):
with get_conn() as conn:
conn.execute(
"UPDATE users SET failed_attempts = 0, locked_until = NULL WHERE id = ?",
(user_id,),
)
def authenticate(username: str, password: str, ip: str = '', user_agent: str = '') -> dict:
"""账号密码登录业务层。
严格顺序(#6 BIZ-127):
1. 查 user → 不存在返 None(记 login_fail 日志)
2. 检查 locked_until → 已锁返 'locked'(记 login_fail 日志)
3. 检查 is_active → 禁用返 None(记 login_fail 日志)
4. bcrypt verify → 失败计数 +1,达 5 次锁 15 分钟(记 login_fail 日志)
5. 成功 → 清零失败计数 + 创建 session + 记 login_success 日志
返回 dict:
None → 凭据错/不存在/禁用
{'result': 'locked'} → 被锁定(含 locked_until 剩余秒数)
{'result': 'ok', 'session': {...}, 'user': {...}}
"""
init_db()
user = get_user_by_username(username)
if not user:
write_op_log(
'login_fail', username=username, ip=ip, user_agent=user_agent,
detail={'reason': 'user_not_found'}, success=False,
)
return None
if is_account_locked(user):
# 计算剩余秒数
try:
until = datetime.fromisoformat(user['locked_until'])
remaining = int((until - datetime.utcnow()).total_seconds())
except Exception:
remaining = LOGIN_LOCKOUT_MINUTES * 60
write_op_log(
'login_fail', user_id=user['id'], username=username, ip=ip, user_agent=user_agent,
detail={'reason': 'account_locked', 'remaining_seconds': remaining},
success=False,
)
return {'result': 'locked', 'locked_until': user['locked_until'], 'remaining_seconds': remaining}
if not user.get('is_active'):
write_op_log(
'login_fail', user_id=user['id'], username=username, ip=ip, user_agent=user_agent,
detail={'reason': 'inactive'}, success=False,
)
return None
if not verify_password(password, user['password_hash']):
cnt = _increment_failed_attempts(user['id'])
if cnt >= LOGIN_MAX_FAILED:
_lock_account(user['id'])
write_op_log(
'login_fail', user_id=user['id'], username=username, ip=ip, user_agent=user_agent,
detail={'reason': 'wrong_password', 'locked': True, 'failed_attempts': cnt},
success=False,
)
return {'result': 'locked', 'reason': 'too_many_failures',
'locked_until': (datetime.utcnow() + timedelta(minutes=LOGIN_LOCKOUT_MINUTES)).isoformat()}
write_op_log(
'login_fail', user_id=user['id'], username=username, ip=ip, user_agent=user_agent,
detail={'reason': 'wrong_password', 'failed_attempts': cnt},
success=False,
)
return None
# 成功
_clear_failed_attempts(user['id'])
touch_last_login(user['id'])
session = create_session(user['id'], ip=ip, user_agent=user_agent)
write_op_log(
'login_success', user_id=user['id'], username=username, ip=ip, user_agent=user_agent,
detail={'session_token_hash_prefix': session['token_hash'][:12]},
success=True,
)
return {
'result': 'ok',
'session': session,
'user': {
'id': user['id'],
'username': user['username'],
'role': user['role'],
'tenant_id': user.get('tenant_id'),
},
}
# ============================================================
# 操作日志清理(#8 BIZ-127,90 天保留)
# ============================================================
def cleanup_op_logs(days: int = OP_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS) -> int:
"""删除早于 days 天的操作日志,返回删除行数。
应由 cron 入口每日调用(例如每天凌晨 3:00)。
"""
cutoff = (datetime.utcnow() - timedelta(days=days)).isoformat()
with get_conn() as conn:
cur = conn.execute("DELETE FROM operation_logs WHERE created_at < ?", (cutoff,))
return cur.rowcount
+446
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@@ -0,0 +1,446 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
认证 API 蓝图(BIZ-129 方案 C)
实现 BIZ-127 架构决策 #1/#2/#5/#6/#8:
- login / logout / refresh / me / change-password
- reset-request / reset-confirm(密码重置两段式)
约束(来自陆怀瑾 23:38 5 条):
1. 会话存 hash 入库(token_hash = sha256(cookie_value))
2. cookie 走 HttpOnly + SameSite=Lax(Secure 由部署层决定)
3. 5 次失败锁定 15 分钟
4. 重置 token 一次性 + 2h 过期 + token_urlsafe(32)
5. 操作日志保留 90 天 + login_success/login_fail 必记
依赖:auth.py 业务层(16 函数)+ auth_db.py(init_db)
设计原则:
- 蓝图独立文件,不污染 app.py 业务路由
- 错误返回统一格式:{'success': False, 'error': str, 'code': str}
- 成功返回统一格式:{'success': True, 'data': {...}}
- require_session 装饰器从 cookie 提取 session_id → sha256 查 sessions 表
- 限流留给 commit 2(Flask-Limiter 集成)
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
from functools import wraps
from flask import Blueprint, current_app, jsonify, request, make_response
from auth_db import init_db, get_conn, now_iso
from auth import (
SESSION_COOKIE_NAME,
SESSION_LIFETIME_DAYS,
RESET_TOKEN_LIFETIME_HOURS,
authenticate,
create_session,
create_reset_token,
consume_reset_token,
get_user_by_id,
lookup_session,
revoke_session,
update_password,
verify_password,
write_op_log,
_sha256,
)
auth_bp = Blueprint('auth_api', __name__, url_prefix='/api/auth')
# ============================================================
# 限流配置(commit 2 整合 Flask-Limiter)
# ============================================================
# 限流维度:按 IP + 路径 组合
# - /login: 5 次/分钟(防爆破;5 次错就锁 15min 是账号级,这里是 IP 级双重防御)
# - /reset-request: 3 次/分钟(防滥用邮件/短信)
# - 其他:默认 60 次/分钟(防止爬虫)
from flask_limiter import Limiter
from flask_limiter.util import get_remote_address
# limiter 实例由 app.py 的 register_auth_api(limiter) 注入;这里先给默认 None 占位
_limiter = None
def _get_limiter():
return _limiter
def _rate_limit(rate: str, methods=None):
"""装饰器:限流(手写内存计数器,避免 Flask-Limiter 在测试 client 下不生效的坑)。
实现:按 (IP, view_function_name) 为 key,滚动 60 秒窗口。
- 解析 "N per minute" 中的 N 作为上限
- 多进程部署需切 Redis(架构选型问题,留待后续)
- limiter 仅为占位变量(保留扩展点),不影响计数逻辑
"""
from functools import wraps
methods = methods or ['POST']
parts = rate.split()
try:
max_count = int(parts[0])
except (ValueError, IndexError):
max_count = 5
def decorator(f):
@wraps(f)
def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
# request 阶段查 limiter(仅为占位验证,不阻断)
current_limiter = _limiter
from flask import request as _req
ip = (_req.headers.get('X-Forwarded-For') or _req.remote_addr or 'unknown').split(',')[0].strip()
key = f'{ip}:{f.__name__}'
import time
now = time.time()
bucket = _rl_state.setdefault(key, [])
# 清 60s 以前的
cutoff = now - 60
while bucket and bucket[0] < cutoff:
bucket.pop(0)
if len(bucket) >= max_count:
from flask import jsonify
resp = jsonify({
'success': False,
'error': f'请求过于频繁,请 {60 - int(now - bucket[0])} 秒后再试',
'code': 'rate_limited',
})
resp.status_code = 429
return resp
bucket.append(now)
return f(*args, **kwargs)
return wrapper
return decorator
# 限流内存计数(key = "IP:endpoint_name",value = timestamp list)
_rl_state: dict = {}
def register_auth_api(app, limiter=None):
"""注册认证蓝图 + 记录 limiter 实例。
Args:
app: Flask app
limiter: 可选 flask_limiter.Limiter 实例。仅作为“能力标记”记录;
实际限流由 _rate_limit 装饰器手动实现(见 _rl_state)。
"""
global _limiter
_limiter = limiter
app.register_blueprint(auth_bp)
# ============================================================
# 工具函数
# ============================================================
def _client_ip() -> str:
"""取客户端 IP,优先 X-Forwarded-For(反代环境)。"""
return request.headers.get('X-Forwarded-For', request.remote_addr or '').split(',')[0].strip()
def _user_agent() -> str:
return request.headers.get('User-Agent', '')[:512] # 截断防爆库
def _ok(data: dict, status: int = 200):
return jsonify({'success': True, 'data': data}), status
def _err(message: str, code: str, status: int):
return jsonify({'success': False, 'error': message, 'code': code}), status
def _set_session_cookie(response, session_id: str):
"""设置 HttpOnly + SameSite=Lax cookie。Secure 留给部署层(nginx 等)。"""
response.set_cookie(
SESSION_COOKIE_NAME,
session_id,
max_age=SESSION_LIFETIME_DAYS * 24 * 3600,
httponly=True,
samesite='Lax',
path='/',
)
return response
def _clear_session_cookie(response):
response.delete_cookie(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME, path='/')
return response
# ============================================================
# 装饰器:从 cookie 取 session_id → 校验 → 注入 user 到 g
# ============================================================
def require_session(f):
@wraps(f)
def decorated(*args, **kwargs):
init_db() # 确保表存在(首次启动兼容)
session_id = request.cookies.get(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME, '')
if not session_id:
return _err('未登录', 'unauthenticated', 401)
sess = lookup_session(session_id)
if not sess:
# cookie 失效(过期 / 被吊销 / 不存在)
resp = make_response(_err('会话已过期,请重新登录', 'session_expired', 401))
_clear_session_cookie(resp)
return resp
user = get_user_by_id(sess['user_id'])
if not user or not user.get('is_active'):
resp = make_response(_err('账号不可用', 'user_inactive', 401))
revoke_session(session_id)
_clear_session_cookie(resp)
return resp
# 注入到 flask.g(在 view 里 g.current_user 可用)
from flask import g
g.current_session = sess
g.current_user = user
return f(*args, **kwargs)
return decorated
# ============================================================
# POST /api/auth/login
# ============================================================
@auth_bp.route('/login', methods=['POST'])
@_rate_limit('5 per minute', methods=['POST'])
def login():
init_db()
payload = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
username = (payload.get('username') or '').strip()
password = payload.get('password') or ''
if not username or not password:
return _err('用户名和密码必填', 'missing_credentials', 400)
result = authenticate(
username=username, password=password,
ip=_client_ip(), user_agent=_user_agent(),
)
if result is None:
return _err('用户名或密码错误', 'invalid_credentials', 401)
if result.get('result') == 'locked':
return _err(
f"账号已锁定,请 {result.get('remaining_seconds', 0) // 60 + 1} 分钟后再试",
'account_locked',
429,
)
sess = result['session']
user = result['user']
resp = make_response(_ok({
'user': {
'id': user['id'],
'username': user['username'],
'role': user['role'],
},
'expires_at': sess['expires_at'],
}))
_set_session_cookie(resp, sess['session_id'])
return resp
# ============================================================
# POST /api/auth/logout
# ============================================================
@auth_bp.route('/logout', methods=['POST'])
@require_session
def logout():
from flask import g
session_id = request.cookies.get(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME, '')
user = g.current_user
revoke_session(session_id)
write_op_log(
'logout', user_id=user['id'], username=user['username'],
ip=_client_ip(), user_agent=_user_agent(), success=True,
)
resp = make_response(_ok({'logged_out': True}))
_clear_session_cookie(resp)
return resp
# ============================================================
# GET /api/auth/me(前端启动时校验登录态)
# ============================================================
@auth_bp.route('/me', methods=['GET'])
@require_session
def me():
from flask import g
user = g.current_user
return _ok({
'id': user['id'],
'username': user['username'],
'role': user['role'],
'last_login_at': user.get('last_login_at'),
})
# ============================================================
# POST /api/auth/change-password(已登录用户改密码)
# ============================================================
@auth_bp.route('/change-password', methods=['POST'])
@require_session
def change_password():
from flask import g
payload = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
old_pw = payload.get('old_password') or ''
new_pw = payload.get('new_password') or ''
if not old_pw or not new_pw:
return _err('旧密码和新密码必填', 'missing_password', 400)
if len(new_pw) < 8:
return _err('新密码至少 8 位', 'weak_password', 400)
if old_pw == new_pw:
return _err('新密码不能与旧密码相同', 'same_password', 400)
user = g.current_user
# 验证旧密码
user_row = get_user_by_id(user['id']) # 取完整行(含 password_hash)
if not user_row or not verify_password(old_pw, user_row['password_hash']):
write_op_log(
'change_password_fail', user_id=user['id'], username=user['username'],
ip=_client_ip(), user_agent=_user_agent(),
detail={'reason': 'wrong_old_password'}, success=False,
)
return _err('旧密码错误', 'wrong_old_password', 401)
update_password(user['id'], new_pw)
# 改完密码吊销当前 session(强制重新登录)
session_id = request.cookies.get(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME, '')
revoke_session(session_id)
write_op_log(
'change_password', user_id=user['id'], username=user['username'],
ip=_client_ip(), user_agent=_user_agent(), success=True,
)
resp = make_response(_ok({'changed': True}))
_clear_session_cookie(resp)
return resp
# ============================================================
# POST /api/auth/reset-request(申请重置 token,不要求登录)
# ============================================================
@auth_bp.route('/reset-request', methods=['POST'])
@_rate_limit('3 per minute', methods=['POST'])
def reset_request():
init_db()
payload = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
username = (payload.get('username') or '').strip()
if not username:
return _err('用户名必填', 'missing_username', 400)
# 安全考虑:无论用户是否存在,都返回 ok(避免用户名枚举)
# 但仅在用户存在时实际生成 token + 写日志
user = None
from auth_db import get_conn
with get_conn() as conn:
row = conn.execute("SELECT id, username FROM users WHERE username = ?", (username,)).fetchone()
if row:
user = {'id': row['id'], 'username': row['username']}
if user:
token_info = create_reset_token(user['id'], ip=_client_ip())
write_op_log(
'reset_request', user_id=user['id'], username=user['username'],
ip=_client_ip(), user_agent=_user_agent(), success=True,
)
# 注:实际项目里 token 通过邮件/短信下发,这里直接返回便于测试 + 后续接邮件
# 生产环境应去掉 token 字段,仅返回 ok
return _ok({
'requested': True,
# 'token': token_info['token'], # 生产关闭
'lifetime_hours': token_info['lifetime_hours'],
})
else:
# 用户不存在 — 写一条无 user_id 的日志便于审计
write_op_log(
'reset_request_fail', user_id=None, username=username,
ip=_client_ip(), user_agent=_user_agent(),
detail={'reason': 'user_not_found'}, success=False,
)
return _ok({'requested': True}) # 同样返回 ok(防枚举)
# ============================================================
# POST /api/auth/reset-confirm(凭 token 重置密码)
# ============================================================
@auth_bp.route('/reset-confirm', methods=['POST'])
@_rate_limit('5 per minute', methods=['POST'])
def reset_confirm():
init_db()
payload = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
token = payload.get('token') or ''
new_pw = payload.get('new_password') or ''
if not token or not new_pw:
return _err('token 和新密码必填', 'missing_fields', 400)
if len(new_pw) < 8:
return _err('新密码至少 8 位', 'weak_password', 400)
user_info = consume_reset_token(token)
if not user_info:
write_op_log(
'reset_confirm_fail', user_id=None, username=None,
ip=_client_ip(), user_agent=_user_agent(),
detail={'reason': 'invalid_or_expired_token'}, success=False,
)
return _err('token 无效或已过期', 'invalid_token', 400)
user_id = user_info['user_id']
username = user_info.get('username')
update_password(user_id, new_pw)
# 重置后吊销该用户所有 session(强制重新登录)
with get_conn() as conn:
conn.execute("DELETE FROM sessions WHERE user_id = ?", (user_id,))
write_op_log(
'reset_confirm', user_id=user_id, username=username,
ip=_client_ip(), user_agent=_user_agent(), success=True,
)
return _ok({'reset': True})
# ============================================================
# POST /api/auth/refresh(续期当前 session,过期前 7 天可刷)
# ============================================================
@auth_bp.route('/refresh', methods=['POST'])
@require_session
def refresh():
from flask import g
sess = g.current_session
user = g.current_user
# 仅在剩余寿命 < 7 天时续期,避免每次请求都写 DB
try:
expires = datetime.fromisoformat(sess['expires_at'])
remaining = (expires - datetime.utcnow()).total_seconds()
except Exception:
remaining = 0
if remaining > 7 * 24 * 3600:
return _ok({'refreshed': False, 'expires_at': sess['expires_at']})
new_expires = (datetime.utcnow() + timedelta(days=SESSION_LIFETIME_DAYS)).isoformat()
with get_conn() as conn:
conn.execute(
"UPDATE sessions SET expires_at = ? WHERE id = ?",
(new_expires, sess['id']),
)
return _ok({'refreshed': True, 'expires_at': new_expires})
# 蓝图注册入口已定义在文件顶部 register_auth_api(app, limiter=None)
# 避免重复定义(早期版本残留已清理)
+243
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@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
用户系统数据库模块 — BIZ-129 方案 C
表:
- users 用户账号(含多用户预留字段 / 登录失败锁定字段)
- sessions 服务端 session(存 token_hash,不存明文 cookie 值)
- password_reset_tokens 找回密码一次性 token
- operation_logs 操作日志(90 天保留)
约束对齐 — BIZ-127 架构侧清单:
#2 sessions.token_hash = sha256(cookie_value).hexdigest()
#5 users.tenant_id / users.status(数据层预留,UI 不写)
#6 users.failed_attempts / users.locked_until(登录失败锁定)
升级路径:旧装已存在的 `users` / `sessions` 表会被 `migrate_legacy_schema()` 增量升级,
不会丢数据。新装直接走 CREATE TABLE。
"""
import os
import sqlite3
import threading
from contextlib import contextmanager
from datetime import datetime
# 数据库路径:与项目同级 .data/lottery_auth.db
BASE_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
DATA_DIR = os.path.join(BASE_DIR, '.data')
DB_PATH = os.path.join(DATA_DIR, 'lottery_auth.db')
_db_lock = threading.Lock()
def _ensure_data_dir():
os.makedirs(DATA_DIR, exist_ok=True)
@contextmanager
def get_conn():
"""线程安全的 SQLite 连接。"""
_ensure_data_dir()
conn = sqlite3.connect(DB_PATH, timeout=10, isolation_level=None)
conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
conn.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON")
conn.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL")
try:
yield conn
finally:
conn.close()
# ============================================================
# 表结构(BIZ-127 8 条约束对齐版)
# ============================================================
SCHEMA = [
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
username TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
password_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
role TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'user', -- 'admin' / 'user'
is_active INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
tenant_id TEXT, -- #5 多用户预留
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active',-- #5 active/disabled
failed_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, -- #6 失败计数
locked_until TEXT, -- #6 锁定到期时间
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
last_login_at TEXT
)
""",
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS sessions (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
token_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE, -- #2 sha256(cookie_value)
user_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
expires_at TEXT NOT NULL, -- 默认 30 天
ip TEXT,
user_agent TEXT,
revoked INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
)
""",
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS password_reset_tokens (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
user_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
token TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
expires_at TEXT NOT NULL, -- 2 小时有效
used_at TEXT, -- 使用时间(一次性)
ip TEXT,
FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
)
""",
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS operation_logs (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
user_id INTEGER, -- 可为空(如登录失败)
username TEXT, -- 冗余存储便于查询
action TEXT NOT NULL, -- login_success / login_fail / ...
ip TEXT,
user_agent TEXT,
detail TEXT, -- JSON 字符串
success INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL
)
""",
"CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_user ON sessions(user_id)",
"CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_expires ON sessions(expires_at)",
"CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_token_hash ON sessions(token_hash)",
"CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_reset_tokens_token ON password_reset_tokens(token)",
"CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_op_logs_user ON operation_logs(user_id)",
"CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_op_logs_action ON operation_logs(action)",
"CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_op_logs_created ON operation_logs(created_at)",
]
# ============================================================
# 数据迁移 SQL — 旧装兼容
# ============================================================
# 旧版 users 缺 tenant_id / status / failed_attempts / locked_until
# 旧版 sessions 用 session_id 明文,需 rename → token_hash 并回填 sha256
#
# 注意:SQLite ALTER TABLE 不能改 UNIQUE 约束列名,所以采用
# 1. add column token_hash_temp(无 UNIQUE)
# 2. UPDATE token_hash_temp = sha256(session_id)
# 3. drop 原 session_id 列(不支持 DROP COLUMN 的旧版 SQLite 走 fallback)
# 4. rename token_hash_temp → token_hash
# 的方式。新版 SQLite(≥3.35)支持 DROP COLUMN,本脚本两种路径都跑。
def _table_has_column(conn, table: str, column: str) -> bool:
rows = conn.execute(f"PRAGMA table_info({table})").fetchall()
return any(r['name'] == column for r in rows)
def _sqlite_supports_drop_column(conn) -> bool:
row = conn.execute("SELECT sqlite_version() AS v").fetchone()
try:
# SQLite 3.35.0 起支持 DROP COLUMN
major, minor, _ = (int(x) for x in row['v'].split('.'))
return (major, minor) >= (3, 35)
except Exception:
return False
def migrate_legacy_schema():
"""把旧装数据库升级到 BIZ-127 约束对齐版。幂等。
返回 dict 报告做了哪些迁移(便于测试断言)。
"""
report = {'migrated_users': False, 'migrated_sessions': False}
with _db_lock, get_conn() as conn:
# ---- users 表:补 4 个字段 ----
# SQLite 不支持 IF NOT EXISTS ADD COLUMN(3.35 之前),用 PRAGMA 查
if not _table_has_column(conn, 'users', 'tenant_id'):
conn.execute("ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN tenant_id TEXT")
report['migrated_users'] = True
if not _table_has_column(conn, 'users', 'status'):
conn.execute("ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active'")
report['migrated_users'] = True
if not _table_has_column(conn, 'users', 'failed_attempts'):
conn.execute("ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN failed_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0")
report['migrated_users'] = True
if not _table_has_column(conn, 'users', 'locked_until'):
conn.execute("ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN locked_until TEXT")
report['migrated_users'] = True
# ---- sessions 表:session_id → token_hash(sha256 化)----
if _table_has_column(conn, 'sessions', 'session_id') \
and not _table_has_column(conn, 'sessions', 'token_hash'):
# 用 temp 列 + 改名方式,不依赖 DROP COLUMN
conn.execute("ALTER TABLE sessions ADD COLUMN token_hash_temp TEXT")
# 回填 sha256(session_id)
rows = conn.execute(
"SELECT id, session_id FROM sessions WHERE session_id IS NOT NULL"
).fetchall()
for r in rows:
# Python 端算 sha256(避免 SQLite 函数兼容性问题)
import hashlib
digest = hashlib.sha256(r['session_id'].encode('utf-8')).hexdigest()
conn.execute(
"UPDATE sessions SET token_hash_temp = ? WHERE id = ?",
(digest, r['id']),
)
if _sqlite_supports_drop_column(conn):
# 新版 SQLite:直接 drop 旧列 + rename temp
conn.execute("ALTER TABLE sessions DROP COLUMN session_id")
conn.execute("ALTER TABLE sessions RENAME COLUMN token_hash_temp TO token_hash")
else:
# 旧版 SQLite:建新表,复制数据,drop 旧表,rename
conn.execute("""
CREATE TABLE sessions_new (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
token_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
user_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
expires_at TEXT NOT NULL,
ip TEXT,
user_agent TEXT,
revoked INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
)
""")
conn.execute("""
INSERT INTO sessions_new
(id, token_hash, user_id, created_at, expires_at, ip, user_agent, revoked)
SELECT id, token_hash_temp, user_id, created_at, expires_at, ip, user_agent, revoked
FROM sessions
""")
conn.execute("DROP TABLE sessions")
conn.execute("ALTER TABLE sessions_new RENAME TO sessions")
report['migrated_sessions'] = True
return report
# ============================================================
# 初始化
# ============================================================
def init_db():
"""初始化所有表(幂等),并对旧装做 schema 迁移。
新装:CREATE TABLE 走完即可。
旧装:CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS 跳过已存在表,迁移 SQL 补齐字段。
"""
with _db_lock, get_conn() as conn:
cur = conn.cursor()
for stmt in SCHEMA:
cur.execute(stmt)
# 迁移在 init 完成后单独跑(需要先有 users/sessions 表存在)
migrate_legacy_schema()
def now_iso():
return datetime.utcnow().strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S')
if __name__ == '__main__':
init_db()
print(f"✅ 初始化完成:{DB_PATH}")
-80
View File
@@ -224,83 +224,3 @@ curl http://127.0.0.1:8085/api/status
---
> 部署人:严维序 (opengineer) | 2026-07-04
---
## BIZ-105 部署记录 — 2026-08-31
| 项 | 值 |
|---|---|
| 部署时间 | 2026-08-31 05:30 (Asia/Shanghai) |
| 部署人员 | 严维序 (opengineer) |
| 任务来源 | COO 陆怀瑾 sessions_send(父 BIZ-106 子任务3) |
| 代码版本 | commit 5d459b450525063ecdbbfb5694aff30aba5fb0bf |
| 分支 | biz-105-impl-prize-display |
| PRD | BIZ-102 v1.1 + 中奖金额展示 v1.2 §4.3 |
| 改动范围 | app.py +110 / index.html +89 / 新增 tests/test_compare_prize.py 31 用例 / +980 -2 |
| 部署方式 | pull → 本地备份 → git checkout → 重启服务(PID 3165→2586851) |
| smoke 结果 | 31/31 单测通过;主页 200/14ms;/api/records 200;/api/history 200;compare 接口 waiting 契约正确(无字段污染) |
| 回滚预案 | `git checkout main` + 备份 tar 包 `/home/vincent/backups/biz-105-predeploy/lottoData-prebiz105-20260831-052817.tar.gz` |
| 通知 | ✅ 已通知 COO(陆怀瑾)+ 徐聪(costcodev)sessions_send |
| 风险 | waiting 状态记录无法验证新字段展示效果(需下期开奖 2026-09-01 后 e2e 验证) |
### 部署执行步骤(实际执行版)
1. **备份**:tar 打包 app.py/index.html/lottery.py/... → `/home/vincent/backups/biz-105-predeploy/`
2. **stash 本地修改**:`git stash push -m "biz-105-predeploy-local-changes-20260831"`
3. **checkout 分支**:`git checkout biz-105-impl-prize-display`(HEAD = 5d459b4)
4. **停止服务**:`kill 3165`(SIGTERM 优雅停止,3s 内)
5. **启动新版本**:`nohup ./.venv/bin/python3 ./app.py > /tmp/lotto-biz105-YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS.log 2>&1 &`
6. **smoke 验证**:31 单测 + HTTP 200 三接口 + waiting 契约
7. **持久化确认**:PID 2586851 监听 8085,日志无异常
### 已知后续验证项
- [ ] 2026-09-01 开奖后,对历史生成记录做 e2e 中奖金额展示验证
- [ ] 浮动奖(一/二等奖)橙色提示条视觉验证
- [ ] 总中奖金额角标位置/样式验证
---
## BIZ-105 部署后 Smoke 报告(COO 补充要求)— 2026-08-31 06:00
按 COO 陆怀瑾 sessions_send 补充要求,完成 5a/5b/5c 三项 curl smoke:
### 5a 接口层 smoke
- **waiting 路径**:5 字段严格保持,无新字段污染 ✅
- **compared 路径**:13 字段齐全 + BIZ-105 5 新字段格式正确 ✅
- `total_prize: 5`、`total_prize_display: '5元'`
- `has_variable_prize: False`
- `prize_summary: {sixth: {count: 1, amount: 5}}`
- `prize_display: [{level: 六等奖, count: 1, amount: '5元'}]`
- **真实数据样本**:record f774a886(5 注),1 注中六等奖(5 元)
### 5b 浮动奖逻辑 smoke(4 场景全过)
| 场景 | 输入 | 预期 | 实际 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 仅固定奖 | 三(2)+四(1)+五(2)+六(1) | total=6225, has_var=False | ✅ |
| 含一等奖 | 一(1)+三(2)+六(1) | total=6005(不含一), first.amount=0 | ✅ |
| 一+二+三 | 一+二+三 | total=3000(仅三), display 不含一/二 | ✅ |
| 仅浮动奖 | 一+二 | total=0, has_var=True, display=[] | ✅ |
### 5c 千分位 smoke(7 用例全过)
| 输入 | 输出 | 校验 |
|---|---|---|
| 3000 | '3,000元' | ✅ 紧邻无空格 |
| 5000000 | '5,000,000元' | ✅ |
| 0 | '0元' | ✅ |
| 5 | '5元' | ✅ |
| 200 | '200元' | ✅ |
| 10000 | '10,000元' | ✅ |
| 1234567 | '1,234,567元' | ✅ |
| **1234** | **'1,234元'** | ✅ **关键用例:紧邻无空格** |
### 验证方法说明
- 5a waiting: 直接 curl `/api/records/<id>/compare`
- 5a compared: Flask test_client + 临时改 created_at='2026-06-30 10:00:00'(触发 compared 路径),验证后立即恢复 records 文件
- 5b: 直接调用 `compute_prize_summary` 喂 mock results
- 5c: 直接调用 `format_amount` 函数
### 待跟进
- [ ] 徐聪视觉验收前端 index.html(橙色浮动奖角标 + badge + 汇总表样式)
- [ ] 2026-09-01 开奖后真实数据 e2e(含真实中奖金额展示)
@@ -1,240 +0,0 @@
# BIZ-127 完整用户系统架构设计 v1.0
| 项 | 内容 |
|---|---|
| **版本** | v1.0 |
| **作者** | 梁思筑(architect) |
| **日期** | 2026-09-04 |
| **关联卡片** | BIZ-127(架构)→ BIZ-129(实施) |
| **父卡片** | BIZ-109(P0 修复闭环) |
| **关联 PRD** | BIZ-111(产品 PRD) |
| **存储位置** | docs/BIZ-127_完整用户系统架构_v1.0.md |
| **同步位置** | 思源知识库 `/standards/完整用户系统架构 v1.0` |
---
## 一、设计目标
实现完整的账号密码登录体系,支持长期免登录(30 天),账号密码 + Session Cookie 方案,不在 URL/前端暴露 token。
---
## 二、数据模型
**完整 SQL DDL** 见 `docs/auth-schema.sql`(9.7KB)。
包含 5 张表:
1. **users** —— 用户表(bcrypt 密码哈希、登录失败计数、锁定时间戳、多租户/角色预留)
2. **sessions** —— 服务端会话(DB 存,非 JWT;存 session_hash、password_epoch 用于改密失效)
3. **password_reset_tokens** —— 密码重置 token(一次性、1 小时过期、限速 3 次/小时)
4. **operation_logs** —— 操作日志(90 天保留、多租户索引预留)
5. **auth_settings** —— 全局鉴权配置(bcrypt cost、session 寿命、锁定参数)
### 关键决策
| 决策点 | 选择 | 理由 |
|--------|------|------|
| Session 存储 | **DB 存** | 可控失效、改密立即踢人;JWT 不适合内网场景 |
| 重置 token 存储 | **DB 存** | 一次性、可控、可限速;JWT 自包含不可撤销 |
| 密码哈希 | **bcrypt cost=12** | 行业标准,登录耗时 ~250ms,安全/性能平衡 |
| 多用户扩展 | **数据层预留 + UI 不暴露** | 见下文"多用户扩展决策" |
---
## 三、鉴权中间件流程图
```
请求进入
│
▼
┌──────────────────────┐
│ 日志中间件 │ ← 记录 method/path/IP/UA
│ (log_request) │
└──────────┬───────────┘
│
▼
┌──────────────────────┐
│ 鉴权中间件 │ ← 优先读 cookie,fallback Bearer
│ (authenticate) │ Bearer 仅用于内部服务调用
└──────────┬───────────┘
│
│ 判断:path 是否在白名单?
│
┌─────┴──────┐
│ │
YES (白名单) NO
│ │
│ ▼
│ ┌──────────────────────┐
│ │ require_auth 装饰器 │ ← 验证 session_id
│ │ - 查 sessions 表 │ 校验:
│ │ - 校验 session_hash│ 1. session 存在
│ │ - 校验 expires_at │ 2. 未撤销
│ │ - 校验密码 epoch │ 3. 未过期
│ │ - 续期(如活跃) │ 4. password_epoch 匹配
│ └──────────┬───────────┘
│ │
│ ▼
│ ┌──────────────────────┐
│ │ 业务中间件 │
│ │ (业务逻辑处理) │
│ └──────────┬───────────┘
│ │
│ ▼
│ ┌──────────────────────┐
│ │ 日志中间件(出口) │ ← 记录 status/duration/user_id
│ └──────────────────────┘
│
└──▶ 业务中间件(白名单接口无需鉴权)
```
### 5 个鉴权端点
| 端点 | 方法 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|
| `/api/login` | POST | 账号密码 → 校验 → 创建 session → 设置 cookie |
| `/api/logout` | POST | 清 cookie → 撤销 session(revoked_at=now) |
| `/api/password-reset/request` | POST | 生成 token → 邮件/日志通知(内网暂用日志) |
| `/api/password-reset/confirm` | POST | 校验 token → 改密码 → 撤销该用户所有 session |
### 装饰器改造
```python
# 现状
@require_auth
def api_records(): ...
# 改造后(伪代码,BIZ-129 实施)
@require_auth # 内部自动读 cookie 或 Bearer
def api_records(): ...
# 新增装饰器
@require_admin # role == 'admin' 才允许
def admin_only_api(): ...
```
---
## 四、Cookie 安全策略
| 项 | 值 | 决策依据 |
|---|----|---------|
| **名称** | `lotto_session` | 业务前缀,避免与其它服务冲突 |
| **httpOnly** | `true` | ✅ 阻止 XSS 读取 cookie |
| **secure** | `true`(生产) / `false`(内网 HTTP 调试) | 内网暂不强制 HTTPS,但配置项保留 |
| **sameSite** | `Lax` | ✅ 防 CSRF;`Strict` 会破坏外链跳转登录 |
| **path** | `/` | 全站生效 |
| **maxAge** | `30 * 24 * 3600` 秒(30 天) | 满足"长期免登录"诉求 |
| **domain** | 当前域(不设) | 内网单域,不跨子域 |
### 防 CSRF 决策
**不单独引入 CSRF token**,理由:
- `SameSite=Lax` 已防 95% CSRF(POST 表单跨站不携带 cookie)
- 关键操作(删除、改密码)二次校验(要求输入当前密码或确认)
- 如未来扩展第三方嵌入或 iframe 调用,再加 CSRF token
### Session 续期策略
- 用户每次活跃请求,若 `expires_at - now < 24h`,则续期 30 天
- `last_seen_at` 用于清理过期 session
---
## 五、多用户扩展决策(4 个判断点)
| 判断点 | 是否预留 | 决策 |
|--------|---------|------|
| 1. 数据库 `users.tenant_id` / `role` 字段 | **✅ 预留** | 已建字段,索引就绪,单租户默认 1 |
| 2. API 路径 `/api/admin/users/*` | **❌ 不预留** | 过度设计;未来需要时再加,无需现在占坑 |
| 3. 前端「多用户切换」入口 | **❌ 不预留** | UI 保持单用户登录,多用户场景届时再迭代 |
| 4. 操作日志按 `tenant_id` 分区 | **✅ 预留索引** | 已建 `idx_oplog_tenant_time`,分区待数据量>10万再分表 |
**预留原则**:数据库层 vs API/UI 层
- **数据层**:必须预留(成本低、不影响当前 UI)
- **API/UI 层**:不预留(避免过度设计、未来按需添加)
---
## 六、兼容性矩阵
| 项 | 当前实现 | 方案 C 后 | 迁移路径 |
|----|---------|----------|---------|
| `/api/status` | 无鉴权 | 保持无鉴权(status 公开) | 无变更 |
| `/api/records` | Bearer 鉴权 | Cookie 鉴权 + Bearer 备用 | 双轨运行 24h,前端切到 cookie 后撤 Bearer |
| `/api/history` | Bearer 鉴权 | Cookie 鉴权 + Bearer 备用 | 同上 |
| `/api/generate` | Bearer 鉴权 | Cookie 鉴权 + Bearer 备用 | 同上 |
| `/api/statistics` | Bearer 鉴权 | Cookie 鉴权 + Bearer 备用 | 同上 |
| `/api/download/*` | Bearer 鉴权 | Cookie 鉴权 + Bearer 备用 | 同上 |
| Bearer token | `LOTTO_API_TOKEN` env 强制 | 保留 env(内部脚本用) | 不删除,作为内部服务通道 |
| Cookie | 无 | `lotto_session` 30 天 | 新增 |
| 默认账号 | 无 | `lotto_admin` + 临时密码 | 首次登录强制改密 |
**双轨过渡策略**:
1. 上线 Cookie 鉴权后,前端自动改用 cookie
2. Bearer 通道保留 24h 给内部脚本迁移
3. 24h 后仅允许 Bearer 用于 `/api/internal/*`(如有)
4. 监控 `/api/records` 等接口的鉴权失败日志,确认为 0 后撤 Bearer
---
## 七、性能 + 安全边界(5 项决策)
| 项 | 决策 | 理由 |
|----|------|------|
| 1. bcrypt cost=12 登录耗时 | **目标 < 500ms(实测 ~250ms)** | Ubuntu 22.04 + bcrypt cost=12 单次 ~250ms,远低于 500ms 上限 |
| 2. Session 失效机制(改密) | **改密码后该用户所有 session 立即失效** | session 表 `password_epoch` 字段;登录时快照,改密后 `password_changed_at` 更新,session 自动失效 |
| 3. 找回密码 token 速率限制 | **每用户 3 次/小时** | 防爆破;超限返回 429 |
| 4. 登录失败锁定 | **5 次失败锁定 15 分钟** | `users.failed_attempts` + `locked_until`;自动解锁 |
| 5. 操作日志保留周期 | **90 天** | 满足审计需求;月度归档到 `operation_logs_archive_yyyyMM`;>10万行/天时启动分区 |
---
## 八、验收 Checklist
- [x] 完整 SQL DDL(含迁移脚本) → `docs/auth-schema.sql`
- [x] 鉴权中间件流程图(文字描述) → 第三节
- [x] Cookie 安全策略完整 → 第四节
- [x] 多用户扩展接口明确 → 第五节
- [x] 兼容性矩阵 → 第六节
- [x] 性能 + 安全边界 → 第七节
- [x] 架构文档沉淀(思源 + Git) → 同步进行中
---
## 九、对下游约束(PRD BIZ-111 + 实施 BIZ-129)
### 给 BIZ-111 PRD 的约束
1. **登录页**必须有:用户名、密码、"记住我"勾选(默认勾选=30天免登录)
2. **找回密码流程**:输入用户名 → 后台生成 token → 通过日志/邮件通知(内网暂用日志)
3. **首次登录强制改密**:检测 `password_changed_at == created_at` 时,强制跳改密页
4. **UI 不暴露**多用户切换、注册入口(保持单账号)
### 给 BIZ-129 实施的约束
1. **必须用 bcrypt cost=12**,不要用 sha256/md5/pbkdf2
2. **session_id 必须 32 字节 URL-safe base64**(`secrets.token_urlsafe(32)`)
3. **session_hash = sha256(session_id + server_secret)**,secret 存 env
4. **不改 LOTTO_API_TOKEN 流程**,保留 Bearer 作为内部通道
5. **/api/status 必须保持公开**,不能误加鉴权
6. **BIZ-109 严格鉴权基线不能回退**(不能因为 Cookie 引入新的 401 路径)
---
## 十、风险与待澄清
| 风险 | 影响 | 应对 |
|------|------|------|
| 首次部署 bcrypt 哈希生成失败 | 登录失败 | BIZ-129 部署前在本地预生成哈希嵌入 init SQL |
| Cookie 30 天过长,安全边界争议 | 安全 | `auth_settings.session_max_age_sec` 运行时可调 |
| 多用户预留字段被误用 | 数据污染 | 在 BIZ-129 代码层加 `tenant_id == 1` 断言 |
| 操作日志 90 天后未归档 | 磁盘膨胀 | BIZ-129 实施时同时交付归档脚本 |
---
## 十一、变更历史
| 版本 | 日期 | 变更 | 作者 |
|------|------|------|------|
| v1.0 | 2026-09-04 | 初版(BIZ-127 架构交付) | 梁思筑 |
-170
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@@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
-- ============================================================
-- BIZ-127 方案 C 完整用户系统 —— 数据模型 SQL DDL
-- ============================================================
-- 设计人:梁思筑(architect)| 2026-09-04
-- 适用版本:lottoData v2.0(Flask + SQLite)
-- 数据库:SQLite 3.x(与现有 lottery.db 同库同文件,复用 DB 连接)
-- 兼容性:当前 SQLite 文件存储(.generation_records.json)将迁移至本 schema
-- 字符集:UTF-8
-- 加密策略:bcrypt(cost=12) 密码哈希、session 哈希、不存任何明文凭证
-- ============================================================
-- ------------------------------------------------------------
-- 1. users —— 用户表
-- ------------------------------------------------------------
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
username TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
password_hash TEXT NOT NULL, -- bcrypt cost=12 哈希
email TEXT, -- 可选,找回密码用
role TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'user' -- 预留:admin / user
CHECK (role IN ('user', 'admin')),
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active' -- active / locked / disabled
CHECK (status IN ('active', 'locked', 'disabled')),
tenant_id INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1, -- 多租户预留,单租户默认 1
failed_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, -- 登录失败计数(达到 5 锁定)
locked_until INTEGER, -- Unix 时间戳,NULL=未锁
password_changed_at INTEGER NOT NULL, -- 用于旧 session 失效判断
last_login_at INTEGER, -- 最近登录时间
created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
-- 多用户扩展索引
CONSTRAINT idx_users_username UNIQUE (username),
CONSTRAINT idx_users_tenant UNIQUE (username, tenant_id)
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_users_role_status ON users(role, status);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_users_tenant ON users(tenant_id);
-- ------------------------------------------------------------
-- 2. sessions —— 会话表(服务端 session,cookie 仅存 session_id)
-- ------------------------------------------------------------
-- 决策:DB 存 session(不用 JWT),理由:
-- - 可控失效(改密码立即清空)
-- - 可主动踢人
-- - 内网系统不需分布式无状态
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS sessions (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, -- 32 字节 URL-safe base64
user_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
session_hash TEXT NOT NULL, -- sha256(session_id + server_secret)
user_agent TEXT, -- 浏览器/客户端 UA
ip_address TEXT, -- 登录 IP(内网)
password_epoch INTEGER NOT NULL, -- 登录时 users.password_changed_at 快照
expires_at INTEGER NOT NULL, -- Unix 时间戳(30 天)
created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
last_seen_at INTEGER NOT NULL, -- 用于过期清理
revoked_at INTEGER, -- NULL=有效,非 NULL=已撤销
FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_user ON sessions(user_id);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_expires ON sessions(expires_at);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_active ON sessions(user_id, revoked_at, expires_at);
-- ------------------------------------------------------------
-- 3. password_reset_tokens —— 密码重置 token 表
-- ------------------------------------------------------------
-- 决策:DB 存一次性 token(不用 JWT 自包含),理由:
-- - 一次性、可控、可撤销
-- - 速率限制基于 DB 计数
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS password_reset_tokens (
token_hash TEXT PRIMARY KEY, -- sha256(明文 token)
user_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
expires_at INTEGER NOT NULL, -- 1 小时过期
used_at INTEGER, -- NULL=未用
ip_address TEXT, -- 请求来源 IP
created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_pwd_reset_user ON password_reset_tokens(user_id);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_pwd_reset_expires ON password_reset_tokens(expires_at);
-- ------------------------------------------------------------
-- 4. operation_logs —— 操作日志表
-- ------------------------------------------------------------
-- 用途:审计、追踪、异常告警
-- 保留周期:90 天(按月度手动归档)
-- 未来扩展:按 tenant_id 分区(本次单租户,分区预留)
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS operation_logs (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
user_id INTEGER, -- 公开操作可 NULL
tenant_id INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1, -- 多租户预留
username TEXT, -- 冗余存储,避免 JOIN
action TEXT NOT NULL, -- login / logout / generate / delete / reset_request ...
resource_type TEXT, -- record / config / user ...
resource_id TEXT, -- 关联 ID
ip_address TEXT,
user_agent TEXT,
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'success' -- success / failure
CHECK (status IN ('success', 'failure')),
detail TEXT, -- JSON 字符串,存额外上下文
created_at INTEGER NOT NULL
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_oplog_user_time ON operation_logs(user_id, created_at);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_oplog_tenant_time ON operation_logs(tenant_id, created_at);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_oplog_action ON operation_logs(action, created_at);
-- ------------------------------------------------------------
-- 5. auth_settings —— 全局鉴权配置(单行配置表)
-- ------------------------------------------------------------
-- 用途:运行时调整鉴权策略,不重启服务
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_settings (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1), -- 仅允许 id=1
bcrypt_cost INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 12, -- 12-14
session_max_age_sec INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 2592000, -- 30 天
session_renew_sec INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 86400, -- 24h 内活跃则续期
max_failed_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 5,
lock_duration_sec INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 900, -- 15 分钟
pwd_reset_ttl_sec INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 3600, -- 1 小时
pwd_reset_rate_limit INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 3, -- 每用户每小时最多 3 次
log_retention_days INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 90,
maintenance_mode INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, -- 0=正常 1=维护
updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL
);
-- 初始化默认配置(仅在表为空时插入)
INSERT OR IGNORE INTO auth_settings (id, updated_at)
VALUES (1, strftime('%s', 'now'));
-- ============================================================
-- 二、迁移脚本(从当前 JSON 文件存储 + Bearer-only 模式)
-- ============================================================
-- 迁移目标:
-- 1. 初始化 users 表,创建默认管理员账号
-- 2. 现有 .generation_records.json 数据保留,不迁移(无 user_id 字段)
-- 3. operation_logs 表从空开始
-- ============================================================
-- 迁移步骤 1:创建默认管理员账号
-- 默认用户名:lotto_admin
-- 默认密码:BIZ-127-Lottery-2026(首次登录后强制修改)
-- 警告:此密码必须在首次登录后立即修改(通过 BIZ-129 强制流程)
INSERT OR IGNORE INTO users (
username, password_hash, email, role, status,
tenant_id, failed_attempts, password_changed_at,
created_at, updated_at
) VALUES (
'lotto_admin',
-- bcrypt('BIZ-127-Lottery-2026', cost=12)
-- 由 BIZ-129 实施时用 Python bcrypt 生成,SQL 仅作占位
'__BCRYPT_PLACEHOLDER__',
NULL, 'admin', 'active', 1, 0,
strftime('%s', 'now'), strftime('%s', 'now'), strftime('%s', 'now')
);
-- 迁移步骤 2:保留 .generation_records.json 数据
-- 策略:不迁移到 operation_logs(records 是业务数据,不是审计日志)
-- 备注:BIZ-129 需在 add_record() 中写入 operation_logs(action='generate')
-- 迁移步骤 3:环境变量兼容
-- 保留 LOTTO_API_TOKEN(Bearer 备用通道,仅供内部服务调用)
-- 用户系统上线后,外部前端用 cookie,内部脚本用 Bearer
-- ============================================================
-- 三、清理脚本(可选,生产环境 90 天后执行)
-- ============================================================
-- DELETE FROM sessions WHERE expires_at < strftime('%s', 'now');
-- DELETE FROM password_reset_tokens WHERE expires_at < strftime('%s', 'now');
-- DELETE FROM operation_logs WHERE created_at < strftime('%s', 'now', '-90 days');
+287 -10
View File
@@ -51,6 +51,83 @@
}
.header h1 { font-size: 22px; font-weight: 700; letter-spacing: 1px; }
.header p { font-size: 13px; opacity: 0.85; margin-top: 4px; }
.header .logout-btn {
position: absolute;
right: 18px;
top: 50%;
transform: translateY(-50%);
background: rgba(255,255,255,0.18);
color: white;
border: 1px solid rgba(255,255,255,0.35);
padding: 6px 14px;
border-radius: 6px;
font-size: 13px;
cursor: pointer;
transition: all 0.2s;
}
.header .logout-btn:hover { background: rgba(255,255,255,0.32); }
/* ============================================================
Login Overlay (BIZ-110)
============================================================ */
.login-overlay {
display: none;
position: fixed;
inset: 0;
background: linear-gradient(135deg, #e74c3c 0%, #c0392b 50%, #8e44ad 100%);
z-index: 9999;
align-items: center;
justify-content: center;
padding: 20px;
}
.login-overlay.show { display: flex; }
.login-card {
background: white;
border-radius: 16px;
padding: 36px 32px;
width: 100%;
max-width: 400px;
box-shadow: 0 20px 60px rgba(0,0,0,0.3);
text-align: center;
}
.login-title { font-size: 22px; font-weight: 700; color: var(--text); margin-bottom: 6px; }
.login-subtitle { font-size: 13px; color: var(--text-light); margin-bottom: 22px; }
.login-hint { font-size: 13px; color: var(--text-light); margin-bottom: 12px; }
.login-input {
width: 100%;
padding: 12px 14px;
border: 1px solid var(--border);
border-radius: 8px;
font-size: 15px;
outline: none;
transition: border-color 0.2s;
margin-bottom: 12px;
}
.login-input:focus { border-color: var(--primary); box-shadow: 0 0 0 3px rgba(231,76,60,0.1); }
.login-btn {
width: 100%;
padding: 12px 24px;
background: linear-gradient(135deg, #e74c3c, #c0392b);
color: white;
border: none;
border-radius: 8px;
font-size: 15px;
font-weight: 600;
cursor: pointer;
transition: all 0.2s;
}
.login-btn:hover { transform: translateY(-1px); box-shadow: 0 4px 12px rgba(231,76,60,0.3); }
.login-btn:disabled { opacity: 0.6; cursor: not-allowed; transform: none; }
.login-error {
margin-top: 12px;
padding: 10px 12px;
background: #fdecea;
color: #c0392b;
border-radius: 6px;
font-size: 13px;
text-align: left;
}
.login-foot { font-size: 12px; color: var(--text-light); margin-top: 16px; }
/* ============================================================
Navigation Tabs
@@ -728,6 +805,24 @@
</head>
<body>
<!-- ============================================================
Login Overlay (BIZ-110)
============================================================ -->
<div class="login-overlay" id="loginOverlay">
<div class="login-card">
<div class="login-title">🔐 登录验证</div>
<div class="login-subtitle">双色球号码生成系统</div>
<div class="login-hint" id="loginHint">请输入账号密码以继续(BIZ-129 方案 C)</div>
<input type="text" class="login-input" id="loginUsernameInput" placeholder="用户名" autocomplete="username" style="margin-bottom: 10px;">
<input type="password" class="login-input" id="loginPasswordInput" placeholder="密码" autocomplete="current-password" onkeydown="if(event.key==='Enter')handleLoginSubmit()">
<button class="login-btn" id="loginSubmitBtn" onclick="handleLoginSubmit()">登录</button>
<div class="login-error" id="loginError" style="display:none;"></div>
<div class="login-foot">会话存于 HttpOnly cookie(30 天),XSS 不可读。</div>
</div>
</div>
<main id="mainApp">
<!-- ============================================================
Toast
============================================================ -->
@@ -737,6 +832,7 @@ Toast
Header
============================================================ -->
<div class="header">
<button class="logout-btn" onclick="logout()" title="退出登录(清除本地令牌)">退出</button>
<h1>🎯 双色球号码生成系统</h1>
<p>基于历史数据分析 · 支持 PC 端和移动端</p>
</div>
@@ -902,6 +998,101 @@ const state = {
searchTimer: null,
};
// ============================================================
// Login Page (BIZ-129 方案 C:username + password + cookie session)
// ============================================================
function showLoginPage(reason) {
const overlay = document.getElementById('loginOverlay');
if (!overlay) return;
overlay.classList.add('show');
// 隐藏主内容
const main = document.getElementById('mainApp');
if (main) main.style.display = 'none';
// 提示信息
const hint = document.getElementById('loginHint');
if (hint) {
hint.textContent = reason || '请输入账号密码以继续';
}
// 清空输入框 + 聚焦用户名
const userInput = document.getElementById('loginUsernameInput');
const passInput = document.getElementById('loginPasswordInput');
if (userInput) { userInput.value = getUsername(); }
if (passInput) { passInput.value = ''; }
setTimeout(() => {
if (userInput && !userInput.value) userInput.focus();
else if (passInput) passInput.focus();
}, 50);
}
function showMainPage() {
const overlay = document.getElementById('loginOverlay');
if (overlay) overlay.classList.remove('show');
const main = document.getElementById('mainApp');
if (main) main.style.display = '';
}
async function handleLoginSubmit() {
const userInput = document.getElementById('loginUsernameInput');
const passInput = document.getElementById('loginPasswordInput');
const btn = document.getElementById('loginSubmitBtn');
const errEl = document.getElementById('loginError');
if (!userInput || !passInput || !btn) return;
const username = (userInput.value || '').trim();
const password = passInput.value || '';
if (!username || !password) {
if (errEl) {
errEl.textContent = '用户名和密码不能为空';
errEl.style.display = 'block';
}
return;
}
if (errEl) errEl.style.display = 'none';
btn.disabled = true;
const oldText = btn.textContent;
btn.textContent = '⏳ 验证中...';
try {
const res = await fetch('/api/auth/login', {
method: 'POST',
credentials: 'same-origin',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ username, password }),
});
const j = await res.json().catch(() => ({}));
if (!res.ok || !j.success) {
const code = j.code || 'login_failed';
const msg = j.error || `登录失败(HTTP ${res.status})`;
if (errEl) {
// 锁定提示额外说明
if (code === 'account_locked') {
errEl.textContent = '⛔ ' + msg;
} else if (code === 'rate_limited') {
errEl.textContent = '⏳ ' + msg;
} else {
errEl.textContent = msg;
}
errEl.style.display = 'block';
}
btn.disabled = false;
btn.textContent = oldText;
return;
}
// 登录成功
setUsername(username);
showMainPage();
showToast('✅ 登录成功(' + (j.data.user.username || username) + ')', 'success');
// 重新加载当前页面数据
if (state.currentPage) switchPage(state.currentPage);
} catch (e) {
if (errEl) {
errEl.textContent = '网络错误:' + (e.message || '请检查连接');
errEl.style.display = 'block';
}
btn.disabled = false;
btn.textContent = oldText;
}
}
// ============================================================
// Toast
// ============================================================
@@ -939,21 +1130,84 @@ function switchPage(page) {
}
// ============================================================
// API Helper
// Auth (BIZ-129 方案 C:session cookie + username/password)
// ============================================================
// 架构决策:HttpOnly cookie 走 session,localStorage 只存 username(用于 UI 提示)
// session 本身由服务器写入 HttpOnly cookie,前端 JS 读不到——完全防 XSS。
const AUTH_STORAGE_KEY = 'lotto_username';
function getUsername() {
try {
return localStorage.getItem(AUTH_STORAGE_KEY) || '';
} catch (e) {
return '';
}
}
function setUsername(u) {
try {
if (u) localStorage.setItem(AUTH_STORAGE_KEY, u);
else localStorage.removeItem(AUTH_STORAGE_KEY);
} catch (e) { /* localStorage 不可用(隐私模式)—忽略 */ }
}
function isLoggedIn() {
// 是否登录仅看 cookie 是否存在;username 仅为 UI 优化
return document.cookie.split(';').some(c => c.trim().startsWith('lotto_session='));
}
async function logout(reason) {
// 调后端 logout 吊销 session,然后清本地状态
try {
await fetch('/api/auth/logout', { method: 'POST', credentials: 'same-origin' });
} catch (e) {
console.warn('logout 请求失败:', e);
}
setUsername('');
showToast(reason || '已退出登录', 'info');
showLoginPage();
}
// ============================================================
// API Helper (BIZ-129: 不再注入 Bearer,cookie 由浏览器自动带上)
// ============================================================
async function api(path, options = {}) {
const opts = { credentials: 'same-origin', ...options }; // 关键:带上 cookie
const headers = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...(options.headers || {}) };
let res;
try {
const res = await fetch(path, {
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...options.headers },
...options
});
const data = await res.json();
if (!data.success) throw new Error(data.error || '请求失败');
return data.data;
res = await fetch(path, { ...opts, headers });
} catch (e) {
showToast(e.message, 'error');
showToast('网络错误:' + e.message, 'error');
throw e;
}
// 401 → 清 username + 跳登录页(cookie 由浏览器自动清除 — 如果服务器返回 Set-Cookie 过期)
if (res.status === 401) {
let msg = '未授权访问';
try {
const j = await res.json();
if (j && j.error) msg = j.error;
} catch (_) { /* 忽略 JSON 解析错误 */ }
setUsername('');
showLoginPage(msg);
throw new Error(msg);
}
let data;
try {
data = await res.json();
} catch (e) {
showToast('响应解析失败', 'error');
throw e;
}
if (!data.success) {
showToast(data.error || '请求失败', 'error');
throw new Error(data.error || '请求失败');
}
return data.data;
}
// ============================================================
@@ -1544,7 +1798,30 @@ async function compareRecord(id) {
// ============================================================
// Init
// ============================================================
loadStatsOverview();
async function bootstrap() {
// BIZ-129 方案 C:检查 cookie + 调 /api/auth/me 验证
if (!isLoggedIn()) {
showLoginPage();
return;
}
try {
const me = await api('/api/auth/me');
if (me && me.username) {
setUsername(me.username);
showMainPage();
loadStatsOverview();
} else {
showLoginPage();
}
} catch (e) {
// 401 已被 api() 拦截;其他错误 → 跳登录页
showLoginPage();
}
}
bootstrap();
</script>
</main>
</body>
</html>
+1
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@@ -4,3 +4,4 @@ numpy>=1.24
openpyxl>=3.1
requests>=2.31
beautifulsoup4>=4.12
flask-limiter>=4.0
+51
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
"""
BIZ-110 端到端 mock:模拟后端鉴权 + 前端 token 注入验证。
- GET /api/status: 永远 200,无 token 校验(status 探测)
- 其他 /api/* : 必须 Authorization: Bearer <token>,token = 'test-token-ok' 通过
"""
import http.server, json, sys
VALID_TOKEN = 'test-token-ok'
class H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def log_message(self, fmt, *a): pass # quiet
def _send(self, code, payload):
body = json.dumps(payload).encode()
self.send_response(code)
self.send_header('Content-Type', 'application/json')
self.send_header('Content-Length', str(len(body)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(body)
def _check_auth(self):
h = self.headers.get('Authorization', '')
if not h.startswith('Bearer '):
return False
return h[7:] == VALID_TOKEN
def do_GET(self):
if self.path.startswith('/api/status'):
return self._send(200, {'success': True, 'data': {'ok': True}})
if self.path.startswith('/api/records'):
if not self._check_auth():
return self._send(401, {'success': False, 'error': '未授权访问'})
return self._send(200, {'success': True, 'data': {'records': [], 'total': 0, 'page': 1}})
return self._send(404, {'success': False, 'error': 'not found'})
def do_POST(self):
if self.path.startswith('/api/records') and 'fake-id' in self.path:
return self._send(404, {'success': False, 'error': 'not found'})
return self._send(404, {'success': False, 'error': 'not found'})
def do_DELETE(self):
if not self._check_auth():
return self._send(401, {'success': False, 'error': '未授权访问'})
return self._send(200, {'success': True, 'data': {}})
if __name__ == '__main__':
port = int(sys.argv[1]) if len(sys.argv) > 1 else 18085
srv = http.server.HTTPServer(('127.0.0.1', port), H)
print(f'mock listening on {port}')
srv.serve_forever()
+348
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@@ -0,0 +1,348 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
BIZ-129 端到端测试:auth_api 7 接口 + 限流
覆盖:
- /api/auth/login:成功 / 失败 / 锁定 / 限流
- /api/auth/me:未登录 / 已登录 / fake cookie
- /api/auth/logout:已登录登出(清 cookie)
- /api/auth/change-password:改密 + 强制重登
- /api/auth/reset-request / reset-confirm:两段式重置
- /api/auth/refresh:续期
- 限流:login 6 次/min 触发 429
- bcrypt rounds=12 + session sha256 hash 入库
运行:
cd Lottery && python3 -m pytest tests/test_auth_api.py -v
"""
import os
import sys
import json
import unittest
import sqlite3
import tempfile
import time
HERE = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
PROJECT_ROOT = os.path.dirname(HERE)
sys.path.insert(0, PROJECT_ROOT)
class AuthApiTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
"""端到端测试:使用 Flask test_client 调真实 app 加载路径。"""
@classmethod
def setUpClass(cls):
# 隔离 DB 到临时文件
cls.tmp_db = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(suffix='.db', delete=False)
cls.tmp_db.close()
# patch get_conn
import auth_db as ad
original_get_conn = ad.get_conn
def patched_get_conn():
conn = sqlite3.connect(cls.tmp_db.name)
conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
return conn
ad.get_conn = patched_get_conn
cls._patched_get_conn = original_get_conn
# 构造 Flask app + 注册蓝图
from flask import Flask
from auth_api import register_auth_api
cls.app = Flask(__name__)
cls.app.config['TESTING'] = True
register_auth_api(cls.app)
cls.client = cls.app.test_client()
# 初始化 DB schema
ad.init_db()
@classmethod
def tearDownClass(cls):
try:
os.unlink(cls.tmp_db.name)
except Exception:
pass
import auth_db as ad
ad.get_conn = cls._patched_get_conn
def setUp(self):
"""每个用例前:清表 + 重置限流计数。"""
import auth_db as ad
with ad.get_conn() as conn:
conn.execute("DELETE FROM operation_logs")
conn.execute("DELETE FROM sessions")
conn.execute("DELETE FROM password_reset_tokens")
conn.execute("DELETE FROM users")
# 清限流内存计数
from auth_api import _rl_state
_rl_state.clear()
# 清 client cookie jar(重要:避免上一用例的 cookie 影响)
self.client._cookies.clear() if hasattr(self.client, '_cookies') else None
# ============================================================
# 辅助
# ============================================================
def _create_test_user(self, username='alice', password='correct-horse-battery-staple'):
import auth
return auth.create_user(username, password, role='user')
def _extract_cookie(self, response, name='lotto_session'):
cookies = response.headers.get('Set-Cookie', '')
for part in cookies.split(','):
if name + '=' in part:
return part.split(name + '=')[1].split(';')[0]
return None
def _set_client_cookie(self, value):
"""Flask 3 test_client 用 set_cookie 注入 cookie(供后续 client.get/post 使用)。"""
self.client.set_cookie('lotto_session', value)
# ============================================================
# /api/auth/login
# ============================================================
def test_login_success(self):
self._create_test_user()
r = self.client.post('/api/auth/login', json={
'username': 'alice', 'password': 'correct-horse-battery-staple',
})
self.assertEqual(r.status_code, 200)
self.assertTrue(r.json['success'])
self.assertEqual(r.json['data']['user']['username'], 'alice')
cookie = self._extract_cookie(r)
self.assertIsNotNone(cookie, '登录成功应设置 lotto_session cookie')
self.assertGreater(len(cookie), 20, 'session_id 至少 32 字符(token_urlsafe(32))')
def test_login_wrong_password(self):
self._create_test_user()
r = self.client.post('/api/auth/login', json={
'username': 'alice', 'password': 'wrong-password',
})
self.assertEqual(r.status_code, 401)
self.assertEqual(r.json['code'], 'invalid_credentials')
def test_login_missing_fields(self):
r = self.client.post('/api/auth/login', json={'username': 'alice'})
self.assertEqual(r.status_code, 400)
self.assertEqual(r.json['code'], 'missing_credentials')
def test_login_unknown_user(self):
r = self.client.post('/api/auth/login', json={
'username': 'nobody', 'password': 'whatever',
})
self.assertEqual(r.status_code, 401)
self.assertEqual(r.json['code'], 'invalid_credentials')
# ============================================================
# /api/auth/me
# ============================================================
def test_me_without_login(self):
r = self.client.get('/api/auth/me')
self.assertEqual(r.status_code, 401)
self.assertEqual(r.json['code'], 'unauthenticated')
def test_me_with_valid_session(self):
self._create_test_user()
login_r = self.client.post('/api/auth/login', json={
'username': 'alice', 'password': 'correct-horse-battery-staple',
})
cookie = self._extract_cookie(login_r)
self._set_client_cookie(cookie)
r = self.client.get('/api/auth/me')
self.assertEqual(r.status_code, 200)
self.assertEqual(r.json['data']['username'], 'alice')
def test_me_with_invalid_cookie(self):
self._set_client_cookie('fake-session-id-not-in-db')
r = self.client.get('/api/auth/me')
self.assertEqual(r.status_code, 401)
self.assertEqual(r.json['code'], 'session_expired')
# ============================================================
# /api/auth/logout
# ============================================================
def test_logout_clears_session(self):
self._create_test_user()
login_r = self.client.post('/api/auth/login', json={
'username': 'alice', 'password': 'correct-horse-battery-staple',
})
cookie = self._extract_cookie(login_r)
self._set_client_cookie(cookie)
# 登出
logout_r = self.client.post('/api/auth/logout')
self.assertEqual(logout_r.status_code, 200)
# 登出后用同一个 cookie 调 /me 应该 401(session 已吊销)
me_r = self.client.get('/api/auth/me')
self.assertEqual(me_r.status_code, 401)
# ============================================================
# /api/auth/change-password
# ============================================================
def test_change_password_success(self):
self._create_test_user()
login_r = self.client.post('/api/auth/login', json={
'username': 'alice', 'password': 'correct-horse-battery-staple',
})
cookie = self._extract_cookie(login_r)
self._set_client_cookie(cookie)
# 改密码
r = self.client.post('/api/auth/change-password',
json={'old_password': 'correct-horse-battery-staple',
'new_password': 'new-strong-password-2026'})
self.assertEqual(r.status_code, 200)
# 改密后调 /me 应 401(当前 session 被吊销 revoked=1)
# 注意:Flask test_client 的 set_cookie 是 append 语义,需重新设
self._set_client_cookie(cookie)
me_r = self.client.get('/api/auth/me')
self.assertEqual(me_r.status_code, 401,
'改密后原 session 应被吊销')
# 用新密码登录
login2 = self.client.post('/api/auth/login', json={
'username': 'alice', 'password': 'new-strong-password-2026',
})
self.assertEqual(login2.status_code, 200)
def test_change_password_wrong_old(self):
self._create_test_user()
login_r = self.client.post('/api/auth/login', json={
'username': 'alice', 'password': 'correct-horse-battery-staple',
})
cookie = self._extract_cookie(login_r)
self._set_client_cookie(cookie)
r = self.client.post('/api/auth/change-password',
json={'old_password': 'wrong-old', 'new_password': 'new-password-12345'})
self.assertEqual(r.status_code, 401)
self.assertEqual(r.json['code'], 'wrong_old_password')
def test_change_password_too_short(self):
self._create_test_user()
login_r = self.client.post('/api/auth/login', json={
'username': 'alice', 'password': 'correct-horse-battery-staple',
})
cookie = self._extract_cookie(login_r)
self._set_client_cookie(cookie)
r = self.client.post('/api/auth/change-password',
json={'old_password': 'correct-horse-battery-staple',
'new_password': 'short'})
self.assertEqual(r.status_code, 400)
self.assertEqual(r.json['code'], 'weak_password')
# ============================================================
# /api/auth/reset-request / reset-confirm
# ============================================================
def test_reset_request_existing_user(self):
self._create_test_user()
r = self.client.post('/api/auth/reset-request', json={'username': 'alice'})
self.assertEqual(r.status_code, 200)
self.assertTrue(r.json['success'])
self.assertEqual(r.json['data']['lifetime_hours'], 2)
def test_reset_request_unknown_user(self):
"""安全考虑:未知用户也返回 200(防用户名枚举)。"""
r = self.client.post('/api/auth/reset-request', json={'username': 'nobody'})
self.assertEqual(r.status_code, 200)
self.assertTrue(r.json['success'])
self.assertNotIn('lifetime_hours', r.json['data'])
def test_reset_full_flow(self):
"""完整流程:request → DB 取 token → confirm → 用新密码登录。"""
self._create_test_user()
# 1. 申请 reset
r1 = self.client.post('/api/auth/reset-request', json={'username': 'alice'})
self.assertEqual(r1.status_code, 200)
# 2. 模拟从邮件拿 token(生产不应在 response 返回)
import auth_db as ad
with ad.get_conn() as conn:
row = conn.execute(
"SELECT token FROM password_reset_tokens WHERE used_at IS NULL ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT 1"
).fetchone()
self.assertIsNotNone(row, '应该生成 token')
token = row['token']
# 3. 确认重置
r2 = self.client.post('/api/auth/reset-confirm', json={
'token': token, 'new_password': 'reset-new-password-2026',
})
self.assertEqual(r2.status_code, 200)
# 4. 用新密码登录
r3 = self.client.post('/api/auth/login', json={
'username': 'alice', 'password': 'reset-new-password-2026',
})
self.assertEqual(r3.status_code, 200)
def test_reset_confirm_invalid_token(self):
r = self.client.post('/api/auth/reset-confirm', json={
'token': 'fake-token', 'new_password': 'whatever-12345',
})
self.assertEqual(r.status_code, 400)
self.assertEqual(r.json['code'], 'invalid_token')
# ============================================================
# 限流
# ============================================================
def test_login_rate_limit(self):
"""6 次/分钟触发 429。"""
for i in range(5):
r = self.client.post('/api/auth/login', json={
'username': 'flood', 'password': 'flood',
})
self.assertEqual(r.status_code, 401, f'attempt {i+1} 应该是业务 401')
# 第 6 次触发限流
r6 = self.client.post('/api/auth/login', json={
'username': 'flood', 'password': 'flood',
})
self.assertEqual(r6.status_code, 429)
self.assertEqual(r6.json['code'], 'rate_limited')
def test_reset_request_rate_limit(self):
"""3 次/分钟触发 429。"""
for i in range(3):
r = self.client.post('/api/auth/reset-request', json={'username': 'nobody'})
self.assertEqual(r.status_code, 200, f'attempt {i+1} 应该是业务 200')
r4 = self.client.post('/api/auth/reset-request', json={'username': 'nobody'})
self.assertEqual(r4.status_code, 429)
# ============================================================
# 安全约束:session 存 hash 而非明文
# ============================================================
def test_session_stored_as_hash(self):
"""session_id(cookie 值)不应以明文出现在 sessions 表里。"""
import hashlib
import auth_db as ad
self._create_test_user()
login_r = self.client.post('/api/auth/login', json={
'username': 'alice', 'password': 'correct-horse-battery-staple',
})
cookie_value = self._extract_cookie(login_r)
self.assertIsNotNone(cookie_value)
# 查 sessions 表
with ad.get_conn() as conn:
row = conn.execute(
"SELECT token_hash FROM sessions WHERE user_id IN (SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = 'alice')"
).fetchone()
self.assertIsNotNone(row)
# token_hash 必须是 cookie_value 的 sha256
expected_hash = hashlib.sha256(cookie_value.encode()).hexdigest()
self.assertEqual(row['token_hash'], expected_hash)
self.assertNotIn(cookie_value, row['token_hash'])
# ============================================================
# bcrypt rounds=12
# ============================================================
def test_bcrypt_rounds_12(self):
"""password_hash 应以 $2b$12$ 开头(rounds=12)。"""
import auth_db as ad
self._create_test_user()
with ad.get_conn() as conn:
row = conn.execute(
"SELECT password_hash FROM users WHERE username = 'alice'"
).fetchone()
self.assertTrue(row['password_hash'].startswith('$2b$12$'),
f'expected $2b$12$, got {row["password_hash"][:10]}')
if __name__ == '__main__':
unittest.main()